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Abstract
	 This	article	attempts	to	uncover	the	possible	roles	of	the	United	Nations	(UN)	in	regulating	the	activities	
of	private	military	and	security	companies	(PMSCs),	which	are	utilized	by	the	UN	in	the	context	of	UN-
led	peacekeeping	operations.	Assessing	 the	 legal	 status	and	 the	cases	 that	highlight	 the	unique	but	
problematic	features	of	PMSCs	primarily	from	a	legal	point	of	view,	this	article	discusses	the	issues	of	the	
attribution	of	conduct,	namely	the	UN’s	responsibility	in	cases	of	abuse	committed	by	PMSC	members,	
and	the	UN’s	role	as	an	effective	regulator,	such	as	providing	a	new	set	of	rules	and	responding	to	cases	of	
international	concern.	
Keywords : private	military	and	security	companies	(PMSCs),	 individual	criminal	 responsibility,	 the	
United	Nations,	peacekeeping	operations,	responsibility	of	international	organizations
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Introduction
	 Private	military	and	security	companies	(PMSCs),	or	‘contractors’,	have	replaced	soldiers	and	members	of	
the	armed	 forces	 in	a	variety	of	 situations,	 including	armed	conflict,	prolonged	military	occupation,	
peacekeeping,	and	territorial	administration	in	post-conflict	institutional	building.1）	The	variety	of	functions	
and	cost-performance	of	PMSCs	 to	perform	some	peacekeeping	functions	are	attractive	 to	 the	decision	
makers	of	not	only	 states	but	 also	 international	organizations	 such	as	 the	United	Nations	 (UN).	The	
outsourcing	of	UN-led	peacekeeping	operations	is	now	widely	observed.	Whereas	arguments	of	whether	the	
use	of	PMSCs	in	peacekeeping	operations	are	effective/appropriate	have	been	actively	debated,2）	this	article	
focuses	 instead	on	 the	ex ante and	ex post	 safeguarding,	 taking	 into	account	 the	circumstances	 in	which	
PMSCs	need	to	be	used	and	are	used	in	UN-led	peacekeeping.	As	one	of	the	legal	scholarships	examining	the	
ways	and	means	of	holding	PMSC	members	accountable	for	their	roles	in	the	reported	human	rights	abuses,3）	
this	article	focuses	on	the	issue	of	responsibility	from	the	perspective	of	the	employer,	particularly	when	the	
employer	is	the	UN,	the	largest	international	organization	responsible	for	the	maintenance	of	world	peace.	As	
the	norms	of	attribution	of	wrongful	acts4）	to	not	only	states	but	also	international	organizations	are	developed	
in	 international	 law,	as	a	 frequent	user	of	PMSCs,	 the	UN	must	be	aware	of	 its	possible	 international	
responsibility.	At	 the	 same	 time,	as	an	 international	organization	seeking	 international	peace	and	 full	
protection	of	human	rights,	the	UN	is	in	a	position	to	regulate	the	activities	of	PMSCs.
	 This	article	attempts	to	conduct	a	legal	analysis	of	the	roles	of	the	UN	as	an	employer	and	a	regulator	of	
PMSCs	utilized	by	 the	UN	 in	 the	context	of	UN-led	peacekeeping	operations,	 focusing	on	 the	 recent	
developments	in	international	legislation	and	practice.	This	article	first	examines	what	types	of	problems	have	
to	be	solved	in	cases	of	wrongful	acts	by	PMSCs.	Secondly,	in	response	to	these	problems	and	with	respect	to	
the	role	of	the	UN	as	an	employer,	this	article	examines	the	possibility	of	attributing	wrongful	acts	committed	
by	PMSC	members	to	the	UN.	With	respect	to	the	UN’s	role	as	a	regulator,	this	article	then	focuses	on	what	
types	of	 functions	 the	UN	provides	 in	general	 regulation	of	PMSCs,	such	as	providing	a	forum	for	rule	
setting,	establishing	 rules	and	supervisory	systems,	cooperating	 to	prosecute	 individuals	and	 imposing	
 1）	 Francesco	Francioni,	‘Private	Military	Contractors	and	International	Law:	An	Introduction’	(2008)	19	EJIL	961;	Human	Rights	Council	‘Why	
we	need	an	International	Convention	on	Private	Military	and	Security	Companies	(PMSCs)’	UN	Doc	A/HRC/WG.10/1/CRP.1	(17	May	2011),	
para.	1.
 2）	 For	opinions	in	favour	of	the	use	of	PMSCs	in	peacekeeping	operations:	e.g. Scott	Fitzsimmons,	‘Dogs	of	Peace:	A	Potential	Role	for	Private	
Military	Companies	in	Peace	Implementation’	(2005)	8(1)	Journal	of	Military	and	Strategic	Studies	1.	For	those	against:	e.g. Sarah	V.	Percy,	
Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations	 (OUP	2007);	Christopher	Spearin,	‘UN	Peacekeeping	and	the	International	
Private	Military	and	Security	Industry’	(2011)	18(2)	International	Peacekeeping	196.
 3）	 E.g. Heather	Carney,	‘Prosecuting	the	Lawless:	Human	Rights	Abuses	and	Private	Military	Firms’	(2006)	Geo.	Wash.	L	Rev	317;	Jenny	S.	Lam,	
‘Accountability	for	Private	Military	Contractors	under	the	Alien	Tort	Statute’	(2009)	97(5)	Cal.	L	Rev	1459;	Katherin	J.	Champman,	‘The	
Untouchables:	Private	Military	Contractors’	Criminal	Accountability	under	the	UCMJ’	(2010)	63	Vand.	L	Rev	1047;	John	S.	Kemp,	‘Private	
Military	Firms	and	Responses	to	Their	Accountability	Gap’	(2010)	32	Journal	of	Law	&	Policy	489.
 4）	 The	legal	tern	‘wrongful	act’	means	here	any	act	that	will	damage	the	rights	of	another,	unless	it	is	done	in	the	exercise	of	another	equal	or	
superior	right.	For	that	reason,	the	scope	of	wrongful	acts	is	not	limited	to	illegal	acts	and	includes	acts	that	are	immoral,	anti-social,	or	libel	
resulting	in	a	civil	suit.	See e.g. Jonathan	Wallace	and	Susan	F.	Wild,	Webster’s New World Law Dictionary	(Webster’s	New	World,	2006).
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sanctions	by	way	of	Security	Council	Resolutions.
	 The	first	chapter	overviews	the	practice	of	using	PMSCs	in	UN-led	peacekeeping	operations.	The	second	
chapter	highlights	the	past	problematic	cases	in	which	the	vague	legal	status	of	PMSCs	and	the	immunity	
potentially	granted	to	PMSCs	contracted	with	the	UN	were	additional	obstacles	with	respect	to	accountability.	
In	the	third	chapter,	the	role	of	the	UN	as	an	employer	is	discussed,	assessing	the	issue	of	responsibility	of	
international	organization.	Finally,	the	forth	chapter	analyzes	the	UN’s	role	as	a	regulator.	
I.	 The	use	of	PMSCs	in	UN-led	peacekeeping	operations
	 In	 the	post-Cold	War	world,	PMSCs	involvement	 in	peacekeeping	operations	rapidly	 increased.	Three	
primary	factors	fueled	the	growth	of	the	private	military	industry:	a	large-scale	reduction	of	military	forces	
after	 the	Cold	War,	which	created	a	surplus	of	 trained	military	personnel	without	 jobs;	 the	policy	shift	 to	
privatizing	government	services	whenever	possible;	and	an	 increase	 in	 regional	conflicts.5）	The	private	
military	industry	is	now	a	booming	sector	of	the	global	economy,	and	most	PMSCs	offer	a	wide	range	of	
services,	including	peacekeeping	and	peacebuilding.6）	A	comparison	between	the	functions	that	have	usually	
been	performed	by	PMSCs	and	 the	 functions	 that	 the	UN	peacekeepers	are	often	expected	 to	perform	
indicates	a	degree	of	overlap.	Although	the	blue	helmets	are	not	supposed	to	perform	any	combat	or	combat	
support	actions	according	to	the	traditional	principles	of	UN	peacekeeping,	now	UN	peacekeeping	missions	
frequently	include	training	and/or	reforming	national	military	units,	providing	security	for	vital	infrastructure,	
protecting	aid	convoys	and	providing	security	 for	 relief	delivery	workers,	assisting	with	demining,	and	
preventing	various	types	of	infiltrations.7）	All	these	functions	appear	to	be	similar	to	a	number	of	activities	that	
have	been	performed	by	PMSCs	 in	 the	past	decade,	which	suggests	 that	PMSCs	have	 the	capability	 to	
perform	a	wide	range	of	peacekeeping	functions.8）
	 The	UN	has	employed	PMSCs	despite	the	comment	by	Enrique	Bernales	Ballesteros,	former	UN	Special	
Rapporteur	on	Mercenaries,	that	the	activities	of	mercenaries	are	criminal	and	“must	be	severely	punished.”9）	
In	practice,	during	the	1990s,	 the	vast	majority	of	PMSCs	actually	provided	almost	all	of	their	services	in	
combat	support,	logistics,	procurement,	training,	and	security	services.10）	Several	PMSCs	are	registered	with	
 5）	 Nelson	D.	Schwartz	and	Noshua	Watson,	‘The	Pentagon's	Private	Army’ (Fortune,	17	March	2003)	<http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune_archive/2003/03/17/339252/index.htm>	accessed	31	January	2013.
 6）	 Oldrich	Bures,	‘Private	Military	Companies:	A	Second	Best	Peacekeeping	Option?’	(2005)	12	International	Peacekeeping	535.	E.g. DynCorp	
International	has	been	providing	 the	 following:	program	management	and	security;	 recruitment,	 training	and	deployment	of	civilian	
peacekeepers	and	police	trainers;	protection	of	diplomats	in	high-threat	countries;	removal	and	destruction	of	landmines	and	light	weapons;	
major	platform	support,	 logistics,	and	contingency	operations	programs;	 intelligence	services;	and	building	 local	capacity.	DynCorp	
International,	‘Overview’	<http://www.dyn-intl.com/about-us/overview.aspx>	accessed	2	August	2012.
 7）	 Bures,	ibid,	536.
 8）	 ibid.
 9）	 ECOSOC	‘The	Rights	of	Peoples	 to	Self-Determination	and	its	Application	 to	Peoples	under	Colonial	or	Alien	Domination	or	Foreign	
Occupation’	UN	Doc	E/CN.4/1995/29	(21	December	1994).
10）	 Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office,	‘Private	Military	Companies:	Options	for	Regulation’	(2002)	London:	The	Stationery	Office	<http://www.
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the	UN	Common	Supply	Database	(UNCSD),11）	and	private	expertise	has	often	been	used	to	support	UN	
peacekeeping	in	activities	such	as	demining	and	water	purification.12）	Transportation,	 logistics,	personnel	
security	and	training	are		services	that	are	outsourced	by	the	UN	as	well.13）
	 One	of	the	most	attractive	features	of	PMSCs	is	their	flexibility.	Against	the	backdrop	of	‘third-generation	
peacekeeping’,	Angola	and	Sierra	Leone	are	the	most	popular	cases,	Executive	Outcomes	(EO),	 the	now-
defunct	South	African-based	PMSC,	offered	this	flexibility	through	its	willingness	to	apply	violence	in	an	
offensive	manner.14）	Analysts	supportive	of	the	use	of	PMSCs	claim	that	international	efforts	to	stabilize	the	
country	would	have	been	much	more	successful	had	EO’s	threat	of	enforcement	remained	because	violence	
quickly	 returned	 to	Sierra	Leone	after	EO’s	departure	 in	1997.15）	The	UN	also	 takes	advantage	of	 the	
possibility	of	buying	services	that	it	has	traditionally	lacked	because	of	national	sensitivity	among	Member	
States.16）	Particularly,	it	obtained	intelligence	information,	satellite	communications	and	imaging	from	private	
sources.17）
	 In	addition	to	its	substantial	efficiency,	 the	expeditiousness	and	cost-performance	of	PMSCs	have	been	
widely	recognized.	 It	has	been	claimed	that	PMSCs	could	have	been	used	 to	prevent	some	of	 the	worst	
shortcomings	of	UN	peacekeeping	in	the	past	decade.18）	In	1994,	for	example,	EO	concluded	in	its	internal	
assessment	report	that	it	had	had	the	capacity	to	intervene	in	the	genocide	in	Rwanda	at	a	lower	cost	and	in	a	
shorter	time	than	the	UN	operation	actually	took.19）	A	similar	proposal	was	also	provided	by	the	International	
Peace	Operations	Association	(IPOA),	a	group	of	14	PMSCs,	which	submitted	an	operational	concept	paper	
globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/mercenaries.pdf>	accessed	31	January	2013.
11）	 The	UNCSD	is	a	registry	of	suppliers	available	to	all	UN	and	World	Bank	procurement	personnel,	and	is	the	main	supplier	database	of	UNDP,	
UNICEF,	UNHCR,	UNOPS	and	WFP.	See	United	Nations	Global	Marketplace	<https://www.ungm.org/>	accessed	9	Aril	2013.
12）	 Julio	Godoy,	 ‘Dogs	of	War	Take	 to	Suits’	 (Global Policy Form,	 18	November	2003)	<www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/
training/1118suits.htm>	accessed	15	October	2012.
13）	 Bures	(n	6)	538.	International	Charter	Incorporated	(ICI)	from	Oregon,	for	example,	was	engaged	at	various	times	by	the	UN,	the	US	and	the	
Economic	Community	of	West	African	States	(ECOWAS)	to	ferry	personnel,	troops	and	supplies	into	and	within	Liberia,	Sierra	Leone	and	
Nigeria	to	support	regional	peacekeeping	operations.	Jim	Fisher-Thompson,	‘Work	of	Private	Military	Contractors	Discussed	at	Congress	
Hearing’	 (IIP Digital,	15	October	2004)	<http://preprod.iipdigital.getusinfo.com/st/english/article/2004/10/200410151730131ejrehs
if0.1410028.html#axzz2JXFliEBE>	accessed	31	January	2013.
14）	 The	‘classic	find,	fix,	and	destroy’	operations	against	the	National	Union	for	the	Total	Independence	of	Angola	(UNITA)	was	conducted	by	EO.	
Peter	W.	Singer,	Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry	(Cornell	University	Press,	2003)	109.	In	addition,	in	Sierra	
Leone,	 the	same	company	was	contracted	to	destroy	the	‘terrorist	enemies	of	 the	state’,	restore	internal	security	and	facilitate	a	positive	
economic	environment	open	to	international	investment.	The	company	conducted	its	mission	between	the	late	spring	of	1995	and	the	autumn	
of	1996.	See	Elizabeth	Rubin,	‘An	Army	of	One’s	Own’	(Harper’s Magazine,	February	1997)	<http://harpers.org/archive/1997/02/an-army-of-
ones-own/>	accessed	31	January	2013.
15）	 David	Shearer,	‘Outsourcing	War’	(Foreign Policy,	1998)	<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/1998/09/15/outsourcing_war>	accessed	31	
January	2013.
16）	 Bures	(n	6)	538.
17）	 ibid.	Defence	Systems	Limited	provided	both	logistical	and	intelligence	support	for	national	contingencies	participating	in	the	UN-sanctioned	
International	Force	in	East	Timor	(INTERFET),	and	DynCorp	provided	helicopter	transport	and	satellite	network	communications.	In	Angola,	
a	private	firm	provided	intelligence	on	UNITA’s	guns-for-gems	trade.	Singer	(n	14)	182.
18）	 Bures	(n	6)	539.
19）	 ibid.	It	claimed	that	it	could	have	had	its	first	armed	troops	on	the	ground	in	14	days	and	have	fully	deployed	1,500	personnel,	supported	by	its	
own	air	and	fire	support,	within	six	weeks.	EO	also	estimated	that	 it	could	conduct	a	six-month	operation	to	create	‘security	islands’	and	
refugee	safe	havens	in	Rwanda	for	$US600,000	per	day	($150	million	in	total).	On	the	contrary,	 the	UN	peacekeeping	operation	United	
Nations	Assistance	Mission	for	Rwanda	(UNAMIR)	II	was	deployed	only	belatedly	after	the	genocide	and	cost	more	than	five	times	EO’s	
estimate	for	its	own	operation.
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outlining	an	offer	by	its	members	 to	provide	services	 to	 the	UN	Organization	Mission	in	 the	Democratic	
Republic	of	the	Congo	(MONUC)	in	January	2003.20）	The	great	advantages	of	hiring	PMSCs	supports	the	
argument	that	the	option	to	exclude	the	use	of	PMSCs	is	no	longer	realistic.
II.	 The	features	of	the	use	of	PMSCs	in	the	UN-led	peacekeeping	operations
1.	 Problematic	cases	involving	PMSCs	
	 In	contrast	to	the	above-mentioned	advantages	that	PMSCs	have	over	state-provided	militaries,	the	critical	
problems	 include	 the	 lack	of	effective	 legal	 regulation,	adjudication	and	access	 to	 remedy	 in	cases	of	
wrongful	acts	committed	by	such	private	employees	in	peacekeeping	missions.	The	insufficiency	is	not	only	
theoretical;	in	fact,	some	problematic	behavior	by	PMSC	members	has	been	reported.	It	is	argued	that	because	
PMSCs	are	not	obligated	to	act	 in	their	home	government's	 interest,	 they	are	free	to	work	with	any	group	
regardless	of	the	moral	or	strategic	ramifications.21）	Although	the	demands	of	a	competitive	market	should	
create	a	disincentive	 to	work	for	an	unpalatable	government	or	organization,	PMSCs	operate	outside	of	
regular	market	forces	and	with	inadequate	oversight.22）	DynCorp	in	Bosnia	is	an	example	of	a	government	
behaving	as	an	irrational	consumer,	hiring	PMSCs	despite	serious	allegations	of	abuse	of	power.	During	the	
Balkan	Wars,	the	United	States	(US)	contracted	with	DynCorp	to	assist	the	UN	Police	Task	Force	in	Bosnia.23）	
Reports	emerged	that	DynCorp	employees	were	buying	and	trading	young	women	and	girls.24）	On	2	June	
2000,	 the	US	military	police	 raided	DynCorp's	 facilities,	 and	 the	US	Army	confirmed	several	of	 the	
allegations.25）	The	information	was	turned	over	to	the	Bosnian	police,	but	none	of	the	people	involved	were	
charged	criminally.26）	Despite	the	incident,	DynCorp	operated	as	a	government-contracted	PMSC	in	Iraq.27）
	 As	of	2006,	more	than	sixty	firms	operate	in	Iraq,	with	more	than	20,000	private	contractors	carrying	out	
military	services	 in	Iraq.28）	The	now-infamous	incident	at	Abu	Ghraib	revealed	that	detainees	were	being	
20）	 IPOA,	‘Supporting	the	MONUC	Mandate	with	Private	Services	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo’	(IPOA Operational Concept Paper,	
2003)	<http://www.hoosier84.com/030201ipoa-drc.pdf>	accessed	15	October	2012.	The	consortium	claimed	 that	PMSCs	would	have	
deployed	within	30–90	days,	providing	services	and	specializations	not	normally	available	from	the	troop-contributing	states,	including	high-
tech	aerial	surveillance,	rapid	police	reaction	and	humanitarian	rescue	capabilities.	The	IPOA	estimated	that	costs	would	not	exceed	20	percent	
of	 the	annual	 total	cost	of	 the	UN	mission	and	proposed	that	 the	US	could	cover	these	as	part	of	 its	normal	27	percent	contributions	for	
MONUC.
21）	 Kemp	(n	3)	500.
22）	 ibid.
23）	 E.	L.	Gaston,	‘Mercenarism	2.0?	The	Rise	of	the	Modern	Private	Security	Industry	and	its	Implications	for	International	Humanitarian	Law	
Enforcement’	(2008)	49	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	228.
24）	 Kemp	(n	3)	500.
25）	 See Robert	Capps,	‘Outside	the	Law’ (Salon.Com,	26	June	2002)	<http://www.robertcapps.com/articles/Dyncorp/dyncorpI.html>	accessed	15	
October	2012.
26）	 Kemp	(n	3)	500.
27）	 Dyncorp	International,	‘Wins	$99	Million	Contract	to	Send	Advisors	to	Iraq’	(8	November	2008)	<http://www.dyn-intl.connews2008/news	1	
10508.aspx>	accessed	15	October	2012.
28）	 ibid.
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subjected	to	various	forms	of	torture	and	humiliation.29）	Investigations	have	revealed	that	employees	of	CACI	
International	and	Titan	Cooperation	(now	L-3	Services)	were	involved	in	this	abuse.30）	However,	despite	the	
prosecution	of	military	members	as	of	January	2006,	no	indictments	or	prosecutions	of	PMSC	contractors	
have	been	filed.	In	the	same	vein,	in	2007,	it	was	reported	that	employees	of	the	US	firm	Blackwater	were	
involved	in	 the	fatal	shootings	of	civilians.	Subsequent	 investigations	revealed	that	Blackwater	had	been	
involved	in	at	 least	195	‘escalation	of	force’	 incidents	 in	Iraq	since	2005	involving	the	firing	of	shots	by	
Blackwater	forces.31）
	 These	cases	do	not	mean	that	PMSC	members	are	more	 likely	 to	commit	human	rights	violations,	but	
regulation	of	such	activities	ex ante	and ex post	has	become	a	serious	issue.	In	the	regulation	of	PMSCs,	three	
inherent	difficulties	are	observed:	 the	 lack	of	effective	prevention/suppression,	sanction,	and	restitution.	
Effective	prevention	requires	pervasive	acknowledgement	of	suppression	against	wrongful	acts,	and	such	
knowledge	works	only	if	 the	realization	of	sanction	is	guaranteed.	In	addition,	access	to	effective	remedy,	
including	satisfaction,	contribution	and	rehabilitation,	needs	to	be	available	for	 the	people	harmed	by	the	
wrongful	acts	of	PMSCs.	Although	such	general	law	enforcement	mechanisms	are	soon	to	be	well	constructed	
at	a	national	level,	the	real	questions	with	respect	to	PMSCs	are	whether	and	by	whom	will	the	acts	of	PMSCs	
be	put	into	such	mechanisms.	
2.	 Problematic	legal	status	of	PMSCs		
	 (1)	Still-undefined	legal	status	of	PMSCs	in	international	law
	 The	answer	to	the	first	question	of	whether	the	members	of	PMSCs	can	be	treated	in	the	course	of	legal	
regulation	depends	on	their	legal	status.	As	a	precondition	for	considering	this	question,	new	players	have	not	
been	a	significant	part	of	the	current	equation	because	international	humanitarian	law	took	its	shape	and	form	
prior	to	and	during	the	Cold	War.32）	The	vague	status	of	PMSCs,	which	evolved	just	after	the	Cold	War,	has	
been	one	of	the	most	appreciated	features	of	the	use	of	PMSCs.	Normally,	mass	extensive	resources	for	war	
require	the	scrutiny,	approval	and	accountability	of	 the	government	and,	 indirectly,	 the	populace.	PMSCs,	
however,	allow	use	of	extensive	resources	without	accountability.33）	The	rights	and	duties	between	military	
actors	and	the	government	are	clear,	whereas	those	between	governments	or	international	organizations	and	
PMSCs	constitute	a	legal	gray	zone.	
	 With	respect	to	the	international	law	regarding	such	contractors,	first,	there	is	still	no	legal	tool	in	force	to	
29）	 Antonio	M.	Taguba,	‘Article	15-6	Investigation	of	the	800th	Military	Police	Brigade’	(2004)	<http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_
report.pdf>	accessed	15	October	2012.
30）	 ibid.
31）	 Memorandum,	Committee	on	Oversight	and	Governmental	Reform,	Congress	of	the	United	States	House	of	Representatives,	110th	Congress	
(1	October	2007)	<http://www.npr.org/documents/2007/oct/house_blackwater.pdf>	accessed	31	January	2012.
32）	 Won	Kidane,	‘The	Status	of	Private	Military	Contractors	under	International	Humanitarian	Law’	(2010)	38(3)	Denv.	J	Int’l	L	&	Pol’y	362.
33）	 Jackson	N.	Maogoto	and	Benedict	Sheehy,	‘Private	Military	Companies	&	International	Law:	Building	New	Ladders	Of	Legal	Accountability	
&	Responsibility’	(2009)	11	Cardozo	Journal	of	Conflict	Resolution	99.
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define	the	category	‘PMSCs’.	Only	the	Geneva	Convention	and	the	International	Convention	Against	 the	
Recruitment,	Use,	Financing,	and	Training	of	Mercenaries	(Mercenary	Convention)	directly	sets	hard	law	
regulation	on	profit	soldiers.34）	Article	47	of	Additional	Protocol	I	to	the	Geneva	Convention	(API)	outlaws	
mercenaries,	as	does	the	Mercenary	Convention,	but	their	narrow	definitions	do	not	adequately	encompass	
today’s	climate	of	the	PMSC	world.35）	By	the	Protocol	definition,	a	mercenary	is	neither	a	national	of	a	party	
to	the	conflict	nor	a	resident	of	the	territory	controlled	by	a	party	to	the	conflict,	and	it	plays	a	direct	part	in	the	
conflict.36）	Under	what	circumstances	would	 the	activities	of	private	contractors	 transporting	petrol	or	
ammunition	to	supply	militaries	constitute	‘direct	participation’?37）	Thus,	such	definitions	do	not	adequately	
address	the	changed	nature	of	privatized	contractors	and	consequently	do	not	adequately	regulate	them.38）	The	
UN	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Use	of	Mercenaries	has	even	stressed	the	option	of	leaving	PMSCs	untouched	
in	the	updated	definition	and	Convention.39）	
	 Kidane	conducts	a	remarkable	analysis	putting	PMSCs	into	defined	categories	of	 lawful	status,	such	as	
combatants	and	civilians	accompanying	them,	and	unlawful	status,	such	as	spies,	mercenaries	and	civilians	
who	engage	in	combat	activities	without	authorization	by	an	analogy-	and	function-based	definition.40）	He	
concludes	that	although	private	military	contractors	perform	legitimate	activities	most	of	 the	time	and,	 in	
times	of	war,	 their	 legal	status	fits	nicely	into	the	non-combatant	designation	of	international	humanitarian	
law,	the	definition	of	their	status	inevitably	begins	to	focus	on	the	functions	they	perform	in	a	given	time	and	
place	because	of	their	wide	range	of	activities.41）	
	 (2)	Immunity	Protection
	 In	addition	to	the	vague	status	of	PMSC	members	in	armed	conflicts,	in	the	case	that	they	are	deployed	as	
peacekeepers,	UN	immunity	can	grant	them	exclusion	from	national	legal	constraints.42）	The	whistle	blowing	
by	Kathryn	Bolkovac,	an	International	Police	Task	Force	(IPTF)	human	rights	officer	hired	by	DynCorp	on	
34）	 Currently,	however,	only	32	nations	have	ratified	the	Mercenary	Convention,	and	none	of	them	are	permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council.	
International	Commission	of	Red	Cross,	‘International	Convention	against	the	Recruitment,	Use,	Financing	and	Training	of	Mercenaries,	4	
December	1989’	<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=530&ps=P#ratif>	accessed	17	October	2012;	Carney	(n	3)	334.
35）	 Tonkin,	however,	argues	that	a	universally	applicable	standard	of	conduct	exists	in	the	form	of	the	primary	obligation	in	Common	Article	I	of	
Geneva	Conventions.	Hannah	Tonkin,	’Common	Article	I:	A	Minimum	Yardstick	for	Regulating	Private	Military	and	Security	Companies’	
(2009)	22	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	779.
36）	 International	Convention	against	the	Recruitment,	Use,	Financing	and	Training	of	Mercenaries	(entered	into	force	20	October	2001)	2163	
UNTS	75,	art	1(1)(b),	(c);	Protocol	Additional	to	the	Geneva	Conventions	of	12	August	1949,	and	Relating	to	the	Protection	of	Victims	of	
International	Armed	Conflicts	(entered	into	force	7	December	1978)	1125	UNTS	3	(Additional	Protocol	I)	art	7(2)(b),	(d).
37）	 José	L.	Gómez	Del	Prado,	‘A	U.N.	Convention	to	Regulate	PMSC?’(2012)	31(3)	Criminal	Justice	Ethics	262,	274.
38）	 Carney	(n	3).
39）	 ECOSOC	‘The	Rights	of	Peoples	 to	Self-Determination	and	its	Application	 to	Peoples	under	Colonial	or	Alien	Domination	or	Foreign	
Occupation:	Use	of	Mercenaries	as	a	Means	of	Violating	Human	Rights	and	 Impeding	 the	Exercise	of	 the	Right	of	Peoples	 to	Self-
Determination’	UN	Doc	E/CN.4/2005/14	(8	December	2004), 15,	16.
40）	 Kidane	(n	32)	375-390.
41）	 ibid,	375-419.
42）	 See e.g.	Manderlier v. United Nations and Belgium,	Court	of	First	Instance	of	Brussels,	May	11,1966,	81	Journal des Tribunaux No.	4553	
(1966);	Manderlier v. United Nations and Belgium,Court	of	Appeals	of	Brussels,	Sept.	15,	1969,	69	ILR	139	(1969).
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another	UN-related	contract	(UN	Mission	in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	(UNMIBH)),	was	a	quite	shocking	
incident.43）	Despite	her	claim	 that	DynCorp	police	 trainers	 in	Bosnia	were	paying	 for	prostitutes	and	
participating	in	sex	trafficking,	none	of	the	DynCorp	employees	were	prosecuted	because	of	their	immunity.44）
	 The	special	feature	of	the	UN	as	an	international	organization	blocks	the	national	jurisdiction	from	dealing	
with	claims	of	violations	committed	by	PMSC	members.	The	UN	normally	conducts	a	Status	of	Forces	
Agreement	(SOFA)	with	the	host	state	in	which	a	peace	operation	is	deployed.45）	This	agreement	regulates	the	
legal	status	of	operation	in	the	host	state,	and	certain	privileges	and	immunities	are	accorded	to	the	operation	
and	its	personnel.	One	of	the	immunities	that	are	normally	accorded	is	that	all	members	of	an	operation	are	
immune	from	the	civil	 jurisdiction	of	the	host	state	for	acts	performed	by	them	in	their	official	capacity.46）	
Article	51	of	 the	Model	SOFA	also	provides	that	all	claims	that	are	private	law	in	character	 to	which	the	
operation	or	a	member	thereof	is	a	party	and	over	which	the	courts	of	the	host	state	do	not	have	jurisdiction	
will	be	settled	by	a	standing	claims	commission	to	be	established	for	that	purpose.	
	 Even	if	the	PMSC	members	are	not	regarded	as	a	‘member’	of	UN	operations,	it	may	still	be	possible	to	
argue	the	immunity	of	PMSCs	by	analogy	from	the	immunity	of	peacekeepers	in	the	absence	of	a	SOFA.	
Article	105	of	the	UN	Charter	provides	immunities	“as	are	necessary	for	the	fulfillment	of	its	purposes,”	and	
the	“officials	of	the	Organization	shall	similarly	enjoy	such	privileges	and	immunities	as	are	necessary	for	the	
independent	exercise	of	their	functions	in	connexion	with	the	Organization.”	It	has	been	noted	that	this	level	
of	immunity	was	specifically	limited	to	functional	necessity	and	to	better	balance	the	interests	of	host	states	
and	the	organization.47）	 Important	for	 this	discussion,	because	peacekeeping	activities	may	take	place	in	a	
failed	or	non-recognized	state,	it	is	alleged	that	such	functional	immunity	even	applies	to	states	that	are	not	
Member	States	of	the	UN.48）
	 Additionally,	the	immunity	of	PMSCs	can	be	set	by	sending	states.	In	the	case	of	Iraq,	for	example,	Order	17	
of	 the	Provisional	Coalition	Authority	 immunized	contractors	from	Iraqi	 law.	Under	 the	provisions	of	 the	
Order,	“[c]ontractors	shall	be	 immune	from	Iraqi	 legal	process	with	 respect	 to	acts	performed	by	 them	
pursuant	 to	 the	 terms	and	conditions	of	a	Contract	or	any	sub-contract	 thereto.”	Additionally,	 the	Order	
specifies	“[a]ll	MNF,	CPA	and	Foreign	Liaison	Mission	Personnel,	and	International	Consultants	shall	be	
subject	to	the	exclusive	jurisdiction	of	their	Sending	States.	They	shall	be	immune	from	any	form	of	arrest	or	
43）	 CorpWatch,	 ‘CSC/DynCorp’	<http://www.corpwatch.org/section.php?id=18>	accessed	31	January	2013.	On	2	August	2002	 the	court	
unanimously	decided	in	her	favor.	Employment	Tribunals,	Bolkovac v. DynCorp Aerospace Operations	 (UK)	Ltd,	‘Unanimous	Decision’	
(Case	no	3102729/01).
44）	 ibid.
45）	 Marten	Zwanenburg,	‘UN	Peace	Operations	Between	Independence	and	Accountability’	(2008)	5	International	Organizations	Law	Review	27.
46）	 ibid.
47）	 William	T.	Worster,	‘Immunities	of	United	Nations	Peacekeepers	in	the	Absence	of	a	Status	of	Forces	Agreement’	(2008)	47(3-4)	Military	Law	
and	the	Law	of	War	Review	277,	318.
48）	 ibid.	As	another	example	of	international	law	ruling	the	immunity,	see also	Article	VI,	section	22,	of	the	Convention	on	the	Privileges	and	
Immunities	of	the	United	Nations.
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detention	other	than	by	persons	acting	on	behalf	of	their	Sending	States.” 49） 
	 What	is	worse	is	that	the	protection	by	UN	immunity	is	one	of	the	attractive	aspects	of	working	for	UN	
peacekeeping	operations,	with	 the	UN	able	 to	ensure	full	deployment	of	staff.	Therefore,	 the	waving	of	
immunity	 is	not	a	popular	option.	The	comment	by	Julian	Harston,	deputy	special	 representative	of	 the	
Secretary-General	 in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina,	 indicates	 the	general	hesitant	 attitude	 toward	waving	
immunity:	“[w]aiving	immunity	is	a	very	difficult	thing	to	do.	We	are	hard	pressed	to	get	police	to	serve	here.	
The	facility	for	it	[waiving	immunity]	exists….	I	don’t	know	of	any	occasion	where	they	were	prosecuted	at	
home.”50）	To	balance	the	requirement	to	maintain	immunity	protection	and	respond	properly	to	the	misconduct	
of	staff	members,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	ensure	 that	 the	UN	as	an	employer	 takes	 full	 responsibility	 for	 the	
activities	of	their	private	contractors.
III.	Responsibility	of	the	UN	as	an	employer
1.	 Two	types	of	relationship	between	the	UN	and	the	PMSCs
	 By	whom	can	 the	wrongful	acts	of	private	contractors	be	 legally	prevented/suppressed,	sanctioned	or	
restituted?	In	the	cases	of	PMSCs	utilized	by	the	UN,	the	first	candidate	would	be	the	UN	itself.	Although	
some	 reports	have	been	published	 focusing	on	 the	appropriateness	of	outsourcing	some	 international	
peacekeeping	operations,51）	 they	provide	no	guarantees	or	remedies	for	violations	of	human	rights	by	the	
individuals	working	for	those	companies.	Therefore,	the	most	urgent	point	is	to	confirm	who	is	responsible	for	
the	misbehavior	of	PMSCs	and	to	whom	can	victims	bring	a	claim	for	remedies.
	 When	is	the	UN	internationally	responsible	for	the	activities	of	the	PMSCs	it	hires?	Whereas	with	military	
members,	because	 they	are	an	 integral	part	of	 the	organic	structure	and	apparatus	of	state,	some	level	of	
control	is	ensured	with	a	chain	of	command,	disciplinary	oversight	and	mechanisms	of	enforcement	that	make	
them	directly	accountable	to	the	state,	private	military	‘contractors’	are,	by	definition,	only	in	a	contractual	
relation	with	the	hiring	state.52）	The	problem	of	accountability	becomes	even	more	complex	when	PMSCs	are	
used	by	 international	 organizations.	 In	practice,	 the	UN	directly	procures	PMSC	services	 from	 its	
headquarters	and	in	the	field.	A	variety	of	agencies,	programs,	funds,	departments	and	divisions	within	the	UN	
family	are	regular	PMSC	customers,	 including	the	UN	Children’s	Fund	(UNICEF),	World	Food	Program	
49）	 However,	contractors	are	no	longer	immune	from	Iraqi	liability	following	the	expiration	of	the	UN	Mandate	in	December	2008.	See	Walter	
Pincus,	‘Fatal	Shootings	by	Iraq	Contractors	Drop’	(Washington Post,	20	December	2008).
50）	 Human	Rights	Watch,	‘Hopes	Betrayed’	(2002)	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina,	Vol.	14,	No.	9	(D)).
51）	 Green	Paper	by	the	British	Foreign	Office	(2002).	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office	(n	10).	An	analysis	by	Refugees	International	(2003).	
Peter	H.	Gantz,	 ‘The	Privatization	of	War’	 (Global Policy Forum,	 18	November	2003)	<www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/
training/1118peacekeeping.htm>	accessed	15	October	2012.	And	a	UN-aimed	initiative	by	the	Global	Security	Partnership	Project	(2003).	
Stephen	Fidler,	‘Proposal	for	Private	Soldiers	in	Peacekeeping	Gathers	Steam’	(Financial Times,	6	November	2003).
52）	 Francioni	(n	1)	962.
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(WFP)	and	UN	Development	Program	(UNDP).53）	PMSCs	also	frequently	get	 involved	in	UN	operations	
through	Member	State	contingencies,	which	is	a	particularly	common	practice	as	far	as	the	US	contributions	
to	 the	UN	are	concerned.54）	Therefore,	both	 types	of	 relationship	(direct	and	 indirect	contracts)	must	be	
examined	separately.
2.	 Attribution	of	the	conduct	of	PMSCs	to	the	UN
	 (1)	PMSCs	contracted	directly	with	the	UN
	 Article	6	of	Draft	Articles	on	the	Responsibility	of	International	Organizations	(ILC	Draft	Articles),	which	
was	submitted	to	the	UN	General	Assembly	in	2011,	provides	that	“[t]he	conduct	of	an	organ	or	agent	of	an	
international	organization	in	the	performance	of	functions	of	that	organ	or	agent	shall	be	considered	an	act	of	
that	organization	under	 international	 law,	whatever	position	 the	organ	or	agent	holds	 in	 respect	of	 the	
organization.”	The	discussion	here	is	whether	the	PMSCs	employed	for	the	purpose	of	peacekeeping	can	be	
regarded	as	an	organ/agent	of	the	UN	itself.	
	 It	is	noteworthy	that	the	International	Court	of	Justice	(ICJ),	dealing	with	the	status	of	persons	acting	for	the	
UN,	considered	relevant	only	the	fact	that	a	person	was	conferred	functions	by	an	organ	of	the	UN.55）	The	
Court	used	 the	 term	‘agent’	and	did	not	consider	whether	 the	person	 in	question	had	a	 relevant	official	
status.56）	In	its	advisory	opinion	on	Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations,	the	
Court	said,	“[t]he	Court	understands	the	word	‘agent’	in	the	most	liberal	sense,	that	is	to	say,	any	person	who,	
whether	a	paid	official	or	not,	and	whether	permanently	employed	or	not,	has	been	charged	by	an	organ	of	the	
organization	with	carrying	out,	or	helping	to	carry	out,	one	of	its	functions	–	in	short,	any	person	through	
whom	it	acts.”	57）	Furthermore,	in	its	advisory	opinion	on	Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process 
of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,	the	ICJ	noted	that	for	“[...]	damages	incurred	as	
a	result	of	acts	performed	by	the	United	Nations	or	by	its	agents	acting	in	their	official	capacity	[...],	[t]he	
United	Nations	may	be	required	to	bear	responsibility	for	the	damage	arising	from	such	acts.”	58）	According	to	
the	ICJ,	the	conduct	of	the	UN	includes,	apart	from	the	actions	of	its	principal	and	subsidiary	organs,	the	acts	
or	omissions	of	its	‘agents’.59）	This	term	is	 intended	to	refer	not	only	to	officials	but	also	to	other	persons	
acting	for	the	UN	on	the	basis	of	functions	conferred	by	an	organ	of	the	organization.	The	requirement	in	
paragraph	1	of	Article	6	of	ILC	Draft	Articles,	which	states	that	the	organ	or	agent	acts	“in	the	performance	of	
53）	 Åse	G.	Østensen,	‘UN	Use	of	Private	Military	and	Security	Companies	Practices	and	Policies’	(2001)	SSR	Paper	3,	The	Geneva	Centre	for	the	
Democratic	Control	of	Armed	Forces.
54）	 ibid.
55）	 See ILC	‘Draft	Articles	on	the	Responsibility	of	International	Organization	with	Commentaries’	(2011),	UN	Doc	A/66/10,	17.
56）	 ibid,	art	2.
57）	 ICJ,	Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations (Advisory	Opinion)	11	April	1949,	177.	See also	ICJ,	Applicability of 
article VI, section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nation (Advisory	Opinion)	15	December	1989,	194.
58）	 ICJ,	Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Right (Advisory	Opinion)	29	
April	1999,	88–89.		
59）	 ILC	(n	55)	18.
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functions	of	that	organ	or	agent,”	is	intended	to	make	it	clear	that	conduct	is	attributable	to	the	international	
organization	when	an	organ	or	agent	exercises	functions	that	have	been	given	to	that	organ	or	agent	and	not	
attributable	when	the	organ	or	agent	acts	in	a	private	capacity.60）	Therefore,	if	the	UN	is	the	direct	contractor	
and	as	long	as	the	PMSCs	exercised	the	UN’s	function,	the	PMSCs’	acts	are	attributable	to	the	UN	according	
to	the	ILC	Draft	Articles.61）
	 (2)	PMSCs	contracted	with	a	seconding	state
	 By	contrast,	when	a	PMSC	makes	a	contract	with	a	state	taking	part	in	UN	peacekeeping	operations,	Article	
7	of	the	ILC	Draft	Articles	may	be	applicable.	Article	7	of	the	ILC	Draft	Articles	provides	that	“[t]he	conduct	
of	an	organ	of	a	State	or	an	organ	or	agent	of	an	international	organization	that	is	placed	at	the	disposal	of	
another	international	organization	shall	be	considered	under	international	law	an	act	of	the	latter	organization	
if	 the	organization	exercises	effective	control	over	that	conduct.”	Article	7	deals	with	situations	such	as	an	
‘organ’	(not	 the	‘agent’)	of	a	seconding	state	being	placed	at	 the	disposal	of	 the	UN	for	a	peacekeeping	
operation.	According	to	Article	7,	 the	organ	may	be	fully	seconded	to	that	organization,	whereas	the	state	
retains	disciplinary	powers	and	criminal	jurisdiction	over	the	members	of	the	national	contingency.62）	Unlike	a	
state’s	military	force,	however,	PMSCs	may	not	be	regarded	as	state	organs.	Whether	PMSCs	can	be	regarded	
as	a	de facto	organ	of	the	sending	state	requires	further	assessment.	The	Commentary	states	that	even	though	
the	articles	do	not	use	the	term	‘agent’,	the	term	‘organ’,	with	reference	to	a	state,	has	to	be	understood	in	a	
wider	sense	as	comprising	those	entities	and	persons	whose	conduct	 is	attributable	to	a	state	according	to	
Articles	5	and	8	on	the	Draft	Articles	on	Responsibility	of	States	for	Internationally	Wrongful	Acts	(ILC	Draft	
on	State	Responsibility).63）	According	 to	 the	Commentary	 to	Article	 5	 of	 the	 ILC	Draft	 on	State	
Responsibility,	an	‘organ	of	state’	may	include	private	companies,	given	that	the	entity	is	empowered	by	the	
law	of	the	State	to	exercise	functions	of	a	public	character	normally	exercised	by	State	organs	and	the	conduct	
of	the	entity	relates	to	the	exercise	of	the	governmental	authority	concerned.	For	example,	private	security	
firms	contracted	 to	act	as	prison	guards	and,	 in	 that	capacity,	exercise	public	powers,	such	as	powers	of	
detention	and	discipline	pursuant	to	a	judicial	sentence	or	to	prison	regulations,	may	be	considered	an	organ	of	
state.64）	In	contrast,	according	to	the	ICJ’s	finding	in	the Application of the Genocide Convention	case,	a	body	
can	be	regarded	as	a	de facto	state	organ	when	the	body	is	‘completely	dependent’	on	the	state.65）	Although	
PMSCs	are	established	according	 to	 the	national	state’s	 laws,	 they	carry	out	company	management	and	
60）	 ibid.
61）	 UN	peacekeeping	operation	has	been	declared	to	be	one	of	the	activities	of	the	UN.	ICJ,	Certain Expenses of the United Nations,	(Advisory	
Opinion)	20	July	1962.
62）	 ILC	(n	55)	19.
63）	 ibid,	20.
64）	 See ILC	‘Draft	Articles	on	Responsibility	of	States	for	Internationally	Wrongful	Acts,	with	Commentaries’	(2001),	UN	Doc	A/56/10,	43.
65）	 ICJ,	Application of the Genocide Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	(Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	v	Serbia	
and	Montenegro)	Judgment,	ICJ	Rep	2007,	p.	43,	para,	393.
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choose	 the	states	with	which	 to	make	contracts.	The	 limitations	on	 their	activities	exist	only	within	 the	
contract	to	which	they	have	consented.
	 Furthermore,	whereas	Article	8	of	the	ILC	Draft	on	State	Responsibility	provides	that	the	conduct	of	a	person	
or	group	shall	be	considered	as	an	act	of	a	state	if	the	act	of	the	person	or	the	group	is	under	effective	control	
of	the	state,	the	requirement	for	applying	Article	7	of	the	ILC	Draft	Article	includes	effective	control	over	the	
act	by	international	organization.	Thus,	such	double	conditions,	which	are	not	 likely	to	coexist,	make	the	
application	of	Article	7	of	the	ILC	Draft	Article	rather	complicated.
	 Therefore,	when	a	seconding	state	is	the	employer	of	a	PMSC,	it	is	still	not	clear	whether	it	is	possible	to	
attribute	the	conduct	of	the	PMSC	to	the	UN	under	Article	7	of	the	ILC	Draft	Articles.	From	the	perspective	
of	the	UN’s	accountability,	 it	 is	recommended	that	 the	UN	makes	a	contract	directly	with	the	PMSCs,	not	
through	the	cooperating	states.	When	the	contractor	is	a	state,	 the	victims	of	wrongful	acts	by	PMSCs	can	
only	bring	a	claim	against	the	sending	state	or	the	host	state,	which	is	far	more	difficult	than	utilizing	the	UN’s	
claim	procedure	because	the	possibility	of	success	in	a	national	procedure	depends	on	the	willingness	of	the	
state	authority	and	 the	 level	of	 judicial	 infrastructure	of	 those	 states.	As	another	option,	 if	 the	UN	 is	
sufficiently	willing,	 it	 is	possible	to	refer	 to	Article	9	of	 the	ILC	Draft	Articles,	which	stipulates	 that	“[c]
onduct	which	is	not	attributable	to	an	international	organization	under	Articles	6	to	8	shall	nevertheless	be	
considered	an	act	of	 that	organization	under	 international	 law	if	and	 to	 the	extent	 that	 the	organization	
acknowledges	and	adopts	the	conduct	in	question	as	its	own.”
IV.	Roles	of	the	UN	as	a	regulator
1.	 Comprehensive	regulatory	attempt	
	 (1)	Providing	a	forum	for	rule	setting
	 Having	found	a	certain	possibility	to	expect	the	UN	to	be	responsible	for	what	PMSC	employees	have	done,	
this	chapter	examines	the	UN’s	role	as	regulator	as	its	second	important	role.	Among	many	other	potential	
roles,	this	article	focuses	on	its	role	in	making	a	comprehensive	regulatory	framework	and	in	responding	to	
cases	of	wrongful	acts.
	 The	UN	Human	Rights	Committee	decided,	for	the	purposes	of	transparency	and	inclusivity,	to	establish	an	
open-ended	intergovernmental	working	group	in	2005.66）	Whereas	in	2008,	 the	soft-law	approach	marked	
some	achievements	and	created	widely	accepted	non-binding	documents	in	Geneva,67）	the	newly	established	
Working	Group	on	the	Use	of	Mercenaries	as	a	Means	of	Violating	Human	Rights	and	Impeding	the	Exercise	
66）	 GA	‘Resolution	adopted	by	the	Human	Rights	Council’	UN	Doc	A/HRC/RES/15/26	(7	October	2010),	para	4.
67）	 ICRC	‘Montreux	Document	on	Pertinent	International	Legal	Obligations	and	Good	Practices	for	States	Related	to	Operations	of	Private	
Military	and	Security	Companies	During	Armed	Conflict’,	(17	September	2008),	41	<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/
montreux-document-170908.htm>	accessed	31	January	2013.
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of	the	Right	of	Peoples	to	Self-Determination	(UN	Working	Group)	is	mandated	to	consider	the	possibility	of	
elaborating	an	international	regulatory	framework	on	activities	of	PMSCs.68）	The	activities	of	the	UN	Working	
Group	crystallized	as	a	Draft	Convention	on	Private	Military	and	Security	Companies	(Draft	Convention)	in	
201069）	and	series	of	reports	on	national	 legislation	practices.70）	The	results	of	 the	UN	Working	Group	are	
expected	to	contribute	to	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	use	of	PMSCs	and	future	regulation.
	 In	addition,	in	November	2010,	the	International	Code	of	Conduct	was	signed	by	hundreds	of	PMSCs.71）	
Although	the	Code	is	an	important	initiative	and	may	raise	standards	across	the	industry,	it	does	not	address	
the	key	issue	of	accountability.72）	Nonetheless,	from	the	perspective	of	the	encouragement	of	self-regulation,	
the	initiative	is	significant.	De	Nevers	finds	that	effective	self-regulatory	schemes	are	more	likely	to	merge	in	
the	shadow	of	a	hierarchy,	or	when	companies	can	be	punished	directly	by	consumers,	which	generates	
reputational	incentive	to	self-regulate.73）	As	a	consumer,	the	UN	has	to	be	aware	of	its	accountability	in	this	
regard.	Moreover,	the	UN	can	potentially	provide	such	occasions	and	forum.	In	fact,	the	UN	Working	Group	
has	commented	on	the	International	Code	of	Conduct.74）
	 (2)	General	rule	setting,	establishing	international	supervision	and	enhancing	national	regulation
	 Another	critical	opinion	is	that	a	national	and	international	system	of	self-regulation	is	not	sufficient	and	that	
there	needs	to	be	a	synthesis	between	international	standard	setting,	supervision	and	accountability,	and	robust	
national	systems	of	licensing	and	regulation	for	successful	regulation	of	PMSCs,	as	with	any	other	attempt	to	
regulate	non-state	actors.75）	The	Draft	Convention	suggested	by	the	UN	Working	Group	is	going	to	provide	
such	an	innovative	but	challenging	combination	of	general	rules,	oversight	and	national	legislation.	
	 The	Draft	Convention	first	defines	inherent	state	functions,	which	are	‘consistent	with	the	principle	of	State	
monopoly	on	the	legitimate	use	of	force’	and	cannot	be	outsourced	or	delegated	to	non-state	actors.76）	As	to	
the	PMSCs	utilized	in	peacekeeping,	it	 is	provided	that	when	using	force,	PMSC	employees	must	exercise	
68）	 GA	‘Resolution	adopted	by	the	Human	Rights	Council’	UN	Doc	A/HRC/RES/15/26.
69）	 ‘Draft	of	a	possible	Convention	on	Private	Military	and	Security	Companies	(PMSCs)	for	consideration	and	action	by	the	Human	Rights	
Council’,	GA	‘Report	of	the	Working	Group	on	the	use	of	mercenaries	as	a	means	of	violating	human	rights	and	impeding	the	exercise	of	the	
right	of	peoples	to	self-determination	(Draft	Convention)’	UN	Doc	A/HRC/15/25	(5	July	2010).
70）	 See e.g.	 ‘National	Legislation	Survey	and	National	Regulatory	Frameworks	on	PMSCs’	<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/
WGMercenaries/Pages/NationalLegislationSurvey.aspx>	accessed	23	January	2013.
71）	 International	Code	of	Conduct	for	Private	Security	Service	Providers	(ICoC)	<www.icoc-psp.org>	accessed	1	December	2011.	As	of	1	June	
2012,	404	companies	had	signed	on	it.
72）	 ibid.
73）	 Renée	De	Nevers,	‘The	Effectiveness	of	Self-Regulation	by	the	Private	Military	and	Security	Industry’	(2010)	30	Journal	of	Public	Policy	219,	
236.
74）	 Human	Rights	Council	‘Submission	by	the	Working	Group	on	the	Use	of	Mercenaries	as	a	Means	of	Impeding	the	Exercise	of	the	Right	of	
Peoples	to	Self-Determination’	UN	Doc	A/HRC/WG.10/2/CRP.1	(6	August	2012).
75）	 Nigel	D.White,	‘The	Privatisation	of	Military	and	Security	Functions	and	Human	Rights:	Comments	on	the	UN	Working	Group’s	Draft	
Convention’	(2011)	11(1)	Human	Rights	Law	Review	137,	144.
76）	 Draft	Convention	(n	69)	Preamble	(at	9),	art	2(i).	It	 is	pointed	out	that,	as	the	listed	activities	include:	 intelligence,	security	and	policing	
application	and	police	powers	and	such	a	wide	definition	seems	to	encroach	on	functions	already	being	performed	by	private	contractors.	It	
will	no	doubt	lead	to	opposition	to	the	Convention	from	states	where	the	PMSC	industry	is	largely	based.	ibid,	138.
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restraint;	must	minimize	damage,	injury	and	loss	of	life;	and	may	only	use	force	to	defend	themselves	from	
imminent	unlawful	threat	of	death	or	serious	bodily	injury,	to	defend	persons	they	are	contracted	to	protect	
under	similar	circumstances,	resist	abduction,	and	to	prevent	the	commission	of	a	serious	crime	that	would	
have	involved	or	involves	a	grave	threat	to	life	or	serious	bodily	injury.77）
	 As	to	 the	oversight,	a	Committee	on	the	Regulation,	Oversight	and	Monitoring	of	Private	Military	and	
Security	Activities	(Oversight	Committee)	would	be	set	up	if	the	treaty	came	into	force.78）	Furthermore,	two	
additional	methods	for	supervision	are	proposed:	an	inquiry	procedure	and	an	individual	and	group	petition	
procedure.79）	It	is	expected	that	jurisprudence	from	those	systems	would	complete	and	adjust	the	regulations	
corresponding	to	current	situations.80）
	 The	Draft	Convention,	 reaffirming	 that	national	 legislative	efforts	will	never	be	successful	without	a	
coordinated	response	by	the	international	community,	also	provides	various	legal	frameworks	to	lead	states	to	
provide	effective	national	regulation	in	an	integrated	manner	with	other	states.81）	Together	with	the	obligation	
to	 investigate,	prosecute	and	punish	 if	violations	of	human	rights	 law	or	 international	humanitarian	 law	
occurs,82）	 it	 is	noted	 that	 to	avoid	 the	development	of	vastly	different	national	 licensing	 regimes	and	
consequent	problems	of	forum	shopping,	further	effort	may	be	necessary	to	specify	some	minimal	conditions	
that	rule	out	the	possibility	of	a	company	being	granted	an	open-ended	and	unsupervised	license.83）	
	 The	Draft	Convention	is	just	a	touchstone	to	observe	states’	responses	to	such	an	international	regulatory	
instrument,	and	it	may	be	quite	difficult	 to	include	all	the	proposals	in	the	future	convention.	However,	 the	
fact	that	discussions	such	as	the	above-mentioned	are	conducted	at	the	UN	forum	is	significant,	and	it	is	not	an	
overreaction	to	expect	further	development	of	an	international	comprehensive	legal	framework	for	the	general	
regulation	of	PMSCs.
2.	 Responding	to	cases	of	wrongful	acts
	 (1)	Cooperation	to	prosecute	the	criminal	acts	committed	by	PMSC	members
	 The	UN	can	be	involved	in	the	issue	of	PMSCs	in	UN-led	peacekeeping	operations	not	only	in	a	general	
manner	but	also	 in	critical	situations	where	 the	UN	is	required	to	respond	using	its	authority	and	power.	
Therefore,	such	case-based	regulatory	action	potentially	taken	is	worth	noted	as	one	of	the	roles	of	the	UN	in	
regulation	of	PMSCs.	
	 Impunity	in	cases	of	criminal	conducts	committed	by	PMSC	members	due	to	a	lack	of	authority	responsible	
77）	 ibid,	art	18(3),	(4).	White	comments	that	this	final	provision	would	apparently	allow	PMSCs	to	defend	civilians	under	imminent	threat	of	serious	
injury,	and	mirrors	the	move	in	the	UN	towards	mandating	peacekeepers	to	protect	civilians.	White	(75)	138.
78）	 ibid,	art	27.
79）	 ibid,	art	33,	37.
80）	 Gómez	Del	Prado	(n	37)	275.
81）	 ibid,	269.
82）	 Draft	Convention	(n	69)	art	7,	9,	10,	13.
83）	 White	(n	75)	144.
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for	 the	PMSC’s	activities	 is	one	of	 the	problems	that	have	 to	be	overcome.	First,	with	no	 judicial	organ	
dealing	with	individual	criminal	responsibility,	the	UN	has	to	rely	on	other	entities:	sending	states’	judicial	
authority,	host	states’	judicial	authority,	or	the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC).	
	 In	the	case	of	peacekeepers	being	sent	by	a	state,	investigation	of	a	crime	is	usually	the	troop-contributing	
state’s	responsibility.	Article	47	of	 the	Model	SOFA	provides	different	procedure	for	cases	with	a	civilian	
component	or	military	members.	Article	47(a)	says	“[i]f	the	accused	is	a	member	of	the	civilian	component	or	
a	civilian	member	of	 the	military	component,	 the	Special	Representative/Commander	shall	conduct	any	
necessary	supplementary	inquiry	and	then	agree	with	the	Government	whether	or	not	criminal	proceedings	
should	be	instituted.”	By	contrast,	paragraph	(b)	of	the	same	article	says	“[m]ilitary	members	of	the	military	
component	of	 the	United	Nations	peace-keeping	operation	shall	be	subject	 to	the	exclusive	jurisdiction	of	
their	respective	participating	States	in	respect	of	any	criminal	offences	which	may	be	committed	by	them	in	
[host-country/territory].”	When	 it	 is	 regarded	 that	 the	PMSC’s	staff	was	sent	by	a	 sending	states	as	a	
‘member’	of	a	peacekeeping	operation,	 the	staff	falls	 into	 the	definition	of	a	‘civilian	staff’	and	need	not	
necessarily	be	prosecuted	exclusively	by	the	sending	state.
	 However,	the	intention	to	let	the	sending	state	prosecute	the	members	of	peacekeeping	operations	regardless	
of	 their	status	was	emphasized	in	 the	Security	Council	Resolution	1593,	which	“[d]ecides	 that	nationals,	
current	or	former	officials	or	personnel	from	a	contributing	State	outside	Sudan	which	is	not	a	party	to	the	
Rome	Statute	of	 the	 International	Criminal	Court	 shall	be	subject	 to	 the	exclusive	 jurisdiction	of	 that	
contributing	State	for	all	alleged	acts	or	omissions	arising	out	of	or	related	to	operations	in	Sudan	established	
or	authorized	by	the	Council	or	 the	African	Union,	unless	such	exclusive	 jurisdiction	has	been	expressly	
waived	by	that	contributing	State.” 84）
	 As	another	option	for	contributing	 to	 justice,	 the	UN	can	cooperate	with	 the	ICC.	Such	a	situation	 is	
obviously	 limited	to	serious	crimes	under	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	ICC:	crimes	of	genocide,	crimes	against	
humanity,	war	crimes,	and	crimes	of	aggression.85）	The	number	of	cases	that	can	be	dealt	with	by	the	ICC	
seems	quite	small	considering	the	gravity	threshold	of	the	ICC.86）	In	February	2006,	the	ICC	Prosecutor,	Luis	
Moreno-Ocampo,	when	explaining	his	decision	not	to	proceed	on	the	basis	of	complaints	filed	concerning	the	
behavior	of	British	troops	in	Iraq	since	the	2003	invasion,	asserted	that	the	number	of	victims	was	not	enough	
to	justify	ICC	prosecution.87）	By	contrast,	citing	the	recent	ICC	case	of	attacks	against	African	Union	Mission	
in	Sudan	(AMIS)	operations	in	Darfur,	Sudan,	where	12	members	of	peacekeeping	operations	were	killed	and	
the	case	was	considered	of	sufficient	gravity,88）	O’Brien	argues	that	cases	where	the	peacekeepers	are	 the	
84）	 UNSC	‘Resolution	1593’	UN	Doc,	S/RES/1593	(31	March	2005).
85）	 Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(entered	into	force	1	July	2002)	2187	UNTS	90,	art	5.
86）	 ibid,	art	17(1),	53.
87）	 The	Office	of	the	Prosecutor	of	the	International	Criminal	Court,	‘OTP	response	to	communications	concerning	Iraq’	(9	February	2006),	9.
88）	 See e.g.	Abu Garda,	‘Decision	on	the	Confirmation	of	Charges’	ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red,	Pre-Trial	Chamber	I	(8	February	2010).
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alleged	perpetrators	of	serious	crimes	are	also	concerned	grave	enough	to	be	tried	before	the	ICC	because	of	
their	role	as	protector.89）
	 As	a	general	agreement	on	 the	cooperation	between	the	ICC	and	the	UN,	 the	Negotiated	Relationship	
Agreement	Between	the	International	Criminal	Court	and	the	United	Nations	was	adopted	on	4	October	2004.	
Furthermore,	the	Memorandum	of	Understanding	Between	the	United	Nations	and	the	International	Criminal	
Court	Concerning	Cooperation	Between	MONUC	and	the	International	Criminal	Court	provides	a	specific	
form	of	cooperation	of	UN	peacekeepers	for	the	activities	of	the	ICC.	However,	these	agreements	are	aimed	
not	at	bringing	the	staff	of	UN-led	peacekeeping	operations	to	the	ICC	but	rather	at	cooperating	widely	in	
gathering	 information	and	surrendering	 the	accused.	The	agreements	may	be	referenced	when	the	UN	is	
motivated	to	do	so,	but	there	is	no	provision	that	obligates	the	UN	to	cooperate	in	the	prosecution	of	members	
of	peacekeeping	operations.	Still,	 the	contributions	of	the	UN	in	ICC	investigations	are	significant;	a	large	
amount	of	evidence	used	in	the	cases	of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	was	provided	by	MONUC.90）
	 (2)	Regulation	as	sanctions	
	 Although	the	UN	Security	Council	 is	 the	entity	that	holds	the	primary	responsibility	for	maintenance	of	
peace	and	is	the	strongest	authority	for	rendering	legally	binding	resolutions	on	security	issues,	it	has	not	yet	
exercised	such	features	on	the	issue	of	PMSCs.	However,	 the	recent	action	of	the	UN	Security	Council	 is	
noteworthy.	
	 The	inclusion	of	‘armed	mercenary	personnel’	within	the	terms	of	the	arms	embargo	imposed	upon	Libya	in	
Security	Council	Resolution	197091）	 and	 further	elaborated	 in	Security	Council	Resolution	1973	holds	
significant	 implications.92）	The	 resolution	“decides	 that	all	Member	States	 shall	 immediately	 take	 the	
necessary	measures	to	prevent	the	direct	or	indirect	supply,	sale	or	transfer	to	the	Libyan	Arab	Jamahiriya,	
(…)	of	(…)	technical	assistance,	 training,	financial	or	other	assistance,	related	to	military	activities	or	 the	
provision,	maintenance	or	use	of	any	arms	and	related	materiel,	including	the	provision	of	armed	mercenary	
personnel	whether	or	not	originating	in	their	territories	(…).” 93）
	 One	of	the	implications	is	that	the	explicit	use	of	the	broader	term	‘armed	mercenary	personnel’	is	likely	to	
include	a	significant	category	of	contractors	working	for	PMSCs.94）	As	a	result	of	British	suggestions	that	
PMSCs	be	contracted	to	aid	or	train	Libyan	rebel	forces,95）	the	width	of	the	terms	of	the	arms	embargo	may	
89）	 Melanie	O’Brien,	‘Prosecutorial	Discretion	as	an	Obstacle	to	Prosecution	of	United	Nations	Peacekeepers	by	the	International	Criminal	Court-
the	Big	Fish/Small	Fish	Debate	and	the	Gravity	Threshold’	(2012)10	JICJ	525,	533-534.
90）	 Heikelina	V.	Stuart,	‘The	ICC	in	Trouble’	(2008)	6	JICJ	409.
91）	 UNSC	‘Resolution	1970’	UN	Doc.	S/RES/1970	(26	February	2011).
92）	 UNSC	‘Resolution	1973’	UN	Doc.	S/RES/1973	(11	March	2011).
93）	 ibid,	para.	9.
94）	 Hin-Yan	Liu,	‘Mercenaries	in	Libya:	Ramifications	of	the	Treatment	of	“Armed	Mercenary	Personnel”	under	the	Arms	Embargo	for	Private	
Military	Company	Contractors’	(2011)16	Journal	of	Conflict	and	Security	Law,	314.
95）	 Patrick	Wintour,	‘Libyan	Rebels	Should	Receive	Training	Funded	By	Arab	Countries,	Says	Britain’	(The Guardian,	6	April	2011)	<http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/06/libyan-rebels-training-funded-arab>	accessed	on	15	October	2012.
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have	the	effect	of	capturing	PMSC	contractors96）	despite	the	general	consensus	that	PMSC	contractors	may	be	
excluded	under	the	tighter	definition	of	‘mercenary’	under	Article	47	of	API.97）
	 To	what	extent	this	inclusion	impacts	the	understanding	and	regulation	of	PMSCs	is	still	unknown,	but	it	can	
at	 least	be	regarded	as	an	 indication	of	world-wide	awareness	and	recognition	of	 the	significance	of	 the	
PMSCs	as	an	actor	in	conflict	situation.	However,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	UN	Security	Council	will	take	further	
steps	 in	 regulation	of	PMSCs	because	 the	US	 is	one	of	 the	most	 frequent	users	of	PMSCs	 in	various	
situations.
Conclusion
	 This	article	attempts	 to	examine	comprehensively	 the	UN’s	roles	as	an	employer	and	regulator	for	 the	
misconducts	committed	by	the	PMSC	members	utilized	 in	UN-led	peacekeeping	operations.	Through	an	
analysis	of	the	attribution	of	wrongful	acts	to	international	organizations	stipulated	in	the	ILC	Draft	Articles,	
the	article	concludes	that	although	it	is	partly	accepted	that	the	activity	of	PMSCs	in	peacekeeping	operations	
can	be	attributed	 to	 the	UN	when	 the	UN	is	 the	direct	employer	and	 the	activity	amounts	 to	one	of	 the	
functions	of	the	UN,	complexity	exists	when	the	PMSCs	make	contracts	with	seconding	states.	As	to	the	role	
as	a	regulator,	the	article	presents	several	positive	effects	of	the	UN	in	its	recent	practice,	including	the	UN	
Working	Group’s	effort	for	general	rule	setting	and	the	Draft	Convention,	which	seeks	establishment	of	an	
international	oversight	regime	and	promotes	national	legislation.	Furthermore,	while	the	UN	is	not	obliged	to	
bring	PMSC	members	who	committed	serious	crimes	to	the	ICC	and	it	is	generally	agreed	that	such	members	
be	prosecuted	in	 their	own	states,	some	forms	of	possible	cooperation	can	be	observed.	Additionally,	 the	
developed	recognition	of	the	necessity	to	regulate	PMSCs	is	found	within	the	practice	of	Security	Council	
Resolutions.	
	 These	regulatory	attempts	have	just	begun.	What	is	needed	then	is	to	make	the	full	use	of	the	forum	provided	
by	the	UN	and	adopt	and	ratify	the	Draft	Convention.	Although	some	effort	could	be	put	into	providing	wide	
understanding	and	awareness	of	 the	 importance	of	 the	proper	uses	of	PMSCs,	creation	of	a	clear	 legal	
framework	for	responding	to	legal	grey	areas	still	has	a	long	way	to	go.	It	is	likely	that	use	of	PMSCs	will	
increase	because	the	UN	has	already	found	them	to	be	useful	and	convenient.	Surely,	the	UN	must	be	well	
prepared	for	future	claims	about	taking	responsibility	of	PMSCs’	activities	and	responding	to	international	
demand	for	regulation,	not	only	from	the	states	but	also	from	the	people	directly	affected	by	the	activities	of	
the	PMSCs.
96）	 Liu	(n	94)	314.
97）	 Hin-Yan	Liu,	‘Leashing	the	Corporate	Dogs	of	War:	The	Legal	Implications	of	the	Modern	Private	Military	Company’	(2010)	15	(1) Journal	of	
Conflict	Security	Law,	141.

